Introduction
Dignāga holds the epistemological theory that our cognition possesses mental images in itself, so-called sākāravijñānavāda and argues that cognition has two forms (dvirūpatā), i.e., the appearance of the cognition itself (svābhāsa) and the appearance of the object (viṣayābhāsa) . He tries to prove this in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 1.11 and its autocommentary Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV). In this article, I would like to reconsider the argument, especially the one in PS(V) 1.11ab, and show a different interpretation from the commonly accepted one. After briefly looking at PS(V), we will examine the interpretation in Prajñākaragupta s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (PVA) and then trace it back to Devendrabuddhi s Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP), Śākyabuddhi s Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (PVṬ), and Jinendrabuddhi s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PSṬ).
Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) 1.11ab
To begin with, let us overview the Sanskrit text of PS 1.11ab with the first half of its commentary in PSV and its translation by Kellner (2010: 209-210) PSV: (1) That is to say, the cognition [that applies] to an object like color and the like certainly (eva) has the appearance of the object and of itself (arthasvābhāsa), (2) whereas the [second] cognition [that applies] to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object, and [also] its own appearance.
(3) Otherwise, if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or had [only] its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be different from the cognition of the object.
The introductory question in PSV clearly expresses that this argument proves that cognition has the two forms. In PS, accordingly, cognition is supplemented as the substratum of the two forms (dvirūpatā), and the long compound in the ablative case (viṣayajñāna-tajjñānaviśeṣāt) is regarded as the reason, which is analyzed as Dvandva and genitive Tatpruṣa. viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣa [jñānasya] dvirūpatā the cognition of an object and the cognition of that object-cognition are different cognition has two forms This interpretation of PS 1.11ab is supported at least by the two major Tibetan translations, 4) but it contains some difficulties. Above all, it is difficult to understand this argument in conformity with the content of PSV. In fact, Dharmakīrti s successors reject this intepretation 5) and give a different one, which will be discussed later. (PVA 403, (20) (21) According to this analysis, sentences (1) to (3) in the PSV quoted above construct the argument as follows:
Prajñākaragupta s interpretation of the PSV
(1) 6) What is to be proved (sādhya): the cognition that applies to an object like color and the like has the appearance of the object and of itself.
(2) Reason (hetu): the second cognition that applies to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object, and also its own appearance.
(3) Proof which invalidates the presence of the reason in the opposite of what is to be proved ([sādhyaviparyaye] bādhakaṃ pramāṇam): if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or had only its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be differentiated by 7) the cognition of the object.
Here the outline of the argument is provided as follows: the cognition of the objectcognition having the two forms (i.e., the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object and the appearance of itself), for which another reasoning would be required, proves the object-cognition having the two forms (i.e., the appearance of the object and of itself).
*viṣayajñānajñānaṃ arthānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ svābhāsaṃ ca viṣayajñānam arthasvābhāsam
the cognition of the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object and its own appearance the cognition of the object has the appearance of the object and of itself This is totally different from the previous argument that the difference between the cognition of an object and the cognition of the object-cognition proves that cognition in general has the two forms. is cognized as having the form of the object (*viṣayākāra) by the cognition of itself.
Devendrabuddhi and others interpretation of the PSV
[Sort of the reason:] this is a reason that is an effect (*kāryahetu), because this differentiation (*vyavasthā) that [X is] cognized as having the form of it (Y) depends on [the cause, namely,] the object (*artha, X) that has the form of it (Y). 8) Otherwise [i.e., when this causal relation is not accepted], 9) this is a reason that is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu). 10) viṣayajñānam: (viṣayākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate viṣayākāram)
cognition of an object: (is cognized as having the form of the object by the cognition of itself has the form of the object)
In this formal argument, only the form of the object among the two forms is dealt with and the form of the cognition itself is disregarded, for no one disputes that cognition has the form of the cognition itself. 11) It also unifies the subject of the argument into cognition of the object, by modifying the reason cognition of the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition (i.e., the object-cognition) that resembles the object (*viṣayajñānajñānaṃ arthānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ) in PSV to cognition of an object is cognized as having the form of the object by the cognition of itself (i.e., the cognition of the object-cognition) (viṣayajñānam viṣayākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate) in a passive form.
Devendrabuddhi and others interpretation of the PS
Now the question is how we can apply this interpretation of PSV to PS 1.11ab. The explanation for PS 1.11ab in PVP, PVṬ, and PSṬ 12) has not been regarded to be acceptable because of its artificiality, but its significance will be apparent if we reconsider it with this question in mind.
According to their explanation, the long compound viṣayajñāna-tajjñāna-viśeṣāt is analyzed as locative Tatpuruṣa and Karmadhāraya, and the pronoun tad refers to viṣaya, which implies viṣayākāra (having the form of the object). 13) In this case, the locative case of viṣayajñāna seems to indicate not only that viṣayajñāna is the object of tajjñāna, i.e., the cognition of this object-cognition, but also that it is the subject of the whole argument.
Based on this assumption, the argument can be illustrated as follows: It is not so difficult to read the similarity between this argument from PS and the previous arguments from PSV discussed in sections 2 and 3.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Dharmakīrti s successors, such as Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Jinen-drabuddhi, and Prajñākaragupta, interpreted PS(V) 1.11ab in a different way from the commonly accepted one. According to them, sentence (1) of PSV should be regarded as what is to be proved (sādhya), the thesis (*pratijñā), or the conclusion of the argument (*sādhanaphala, pramāṇaphala), and sentence (2) as the reason (hetu). Therefore, the structure of the argument is that cognition of an object (viṣayajñāna) having the two forms is proved by the cognition of this object-cognition (*viṣayajñānajñāna) having the two forms. Moreover, Devendrabuddhi and others structured a formal argument in Dharmakīrti s formula style, where the subject is unified into the cognition of the object and only the form of the object is dealt with. They also analyzed the long compound in PS 1.11ab, viṣayajñāna-tajjñāna-viśeṣāt, along this interpretation of PSV.
Notes 1) Kellner provides a relatively clear explanation, basically following Hattori (1968: 29-30) .
2) Fully reconstructed words without attested Sanskrit fragments from PSṬ are printed in roman typeface as in Kellner (2010: 209) .
3) I added the numbering (1) to (3) for the sake of later discussion. 4) For the details of Tibetan translations by Vasudhararakṣita (yul shes pa dang de'i shes pa'i // dbye bas blo yi tshul gnyis nyid //) and Kanakavarman (yul shes pa dang de shes pa'i // dbye bas blo yi tshul gnyis nyid //), see Hattori (1968: 184-185) . 5) Śākyabuddhi most definitely rejects this interpretation. See PVṬ (D224a7-b1, P276b7-277a1): yul shes pa dang de shes pa dag gi bye brag ces 'grel pa byed pa kha cig gi (gis?) zlas dbye ba'i (*Dvandva) snying po can gyi de'i skyes bu'i (*Tatpuruṣa) drug pa (genitive) yin par rtogs so // de yang rigs pa ma yin te gang gi phyir rnam pa med pa yin na yang rnam par rtog pa dang rtog pa med pa rang gi mtshan nyid tha dad pa'i sgo nas yul shes pa dang de shes pa dag gi bye brag gzhan gyis de'i tshe brjod par nus pa /.
6) This numbering corresponds to that in PSV quoted in section 1. 7) Kellner s translation not be different from the cognition of the object for viṣayajñānenāviśiṣṭam seems to be too affected by the Tibetan translations, so I changed it. 8) For this syntactical structure, see PVṬ (D227a5-6, P280a8): de'i rnam pa can la dmigs pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs nyid sgrub par byed do //. Accordingly, the punctuation of PSṬ 79, 14-15 should be changed as in n. 12. 9) See PVṬ (D227a7-b1, P280b3): gzhan gyi tshe ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so zhes bya ba ni gal te ji skad du bshad pa'i rgyu dang 'bras bu nyid du mi 'dod pa de'i tshe rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs nyid yin te /. 10) See PVP (D232a2-4, P273b6-274a1): sbyor ba ni gang zhig gang gi rnam pa can la rang gi shes pas dmigs par 'gyur ba de ni de'i rnam pa can du 'gyur te / dper na lkog shal la sogs pa dang ldan pa'i rnam pa can gyi ba lang gi shes pas dmigs pa na lkog shal la sogs pa dang ldan pa yin pa lta bu'o // yul gyi rnam pa can gyi shes pa yang rang gi shes pas dmigs pa yin no // de'i rnam pa can la dmigs pa zhes bya ba'i rnam gzhag 'di ni don de'i rnam pa can gyi (gyi D; gyi om. P) rgyu can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ni 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs nyid yin la / gzhan gyi tshe ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so //. I translated this PVP referring to the parallel in PSṬ 79, 11-15: yad yadākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate, tadākāraṃ tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādimadākāraḥ svajñānenālambyamāno gauḥ sāsnādimadākāraḥ. viṣayākāraṃ ca viṣayajñānaṃ svajñānenālambyate. tadākāro 'yam ālambyata ity asyā vyavasthāyās tadākāranibandhanatvāt, tasyāṃ sādhyāyam idaṃ kāryam. tadākāratve tu svabhāvaḥ. 11) See, for example, PSṬ 77, 14-78, 1: na hi sa kaścid vādī, yo jñānasya jñānarūpaṃ necchati. 12) See PVP (D231a5-6, P272b7-8): yul shes pa ni gzugs la sogs pa 'dzin pa ste mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa'o // yul shes pa de la de'i shes pa ni yul shes pa de'i shes pa'o (yul shes pa de'i shes pa ['o] PVṬ; shes pa ste yul shes pa'o DP) // yul gyi rnam pa can gyi shes pa'i shes pa ni rtog (rtog PVṬ; rtogs DP) pa zhes bya ba'i don to // de nyid bye brag yin te yul gyi shes pa nyams su myong ba'i rnam pa'i khyad par las zhes bya ba'i (zhes bya ba'i D; zhes pa'i P) don to //, PVṬ (D224b1-225a1, P277a1-277b3 
